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Abstract. The intense research activity on Twin-Field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) is
motivated by the fact that two users can establish a secret key by relying on single-photon interference
in an untrusted node. Thanks to this feature, variants of the protocol have been proven to beat the
point-to-point private capacity of a lossy quantum channel. Here we generalize the main idea of the
TF-QKD protocol introduced by Curty et al. to the multipartite scenario, by devising a conference key
agreement (CKA) where the users simultaneously distill a secret conference key through single-photon
interference. The new CKA is better suited to high-loss scenarios than previous multipartite QKD
schemes and it employs for the first time a W -class state as its entanglement resource. We prove the
protocol’s security in the finite-key regime and under general attacks. We also compare its performance
with the iterative use of bipartite QKD protocols and show that our truly multipartite scheme can be
advantageous, depending on the loss and on the state preparation.
The most mature and developed application of quantum communication [1, 2] is certainly quantum
key distribution (QKD) [3–8]. The majority of the QKD protocols proposed so far involve just two
end-users, Alice and Bob, who want to establish a secret shared key. Nowadays there is a vibrant
research towards protocols which are proven to be secure in the most adversarial situation possible
(i.e. reducing the assumption on the devices) [9–14], but at the same time are also implementable with
today’s technology [15–18]. In this context, a protocol which recently received great attention is the
Twin-Field (TF) QKD protocol originally proposed by Lucamarini et al. [19], further developed to prove
its security [20–27] and experimentally implemented [28–31]. Indeed, the TF-QKD protocol relies only on
single-photon interference occurring in an untrusted node, making it a measurement-device-independent
(MDI) QKD protocol capable of overcoming the repeaterless bounds [32,33].
In a scenario where several users are required to share a common secret key, one can for instance perform
bipartite QKD protocols between pairs of users and then use the secret keys established in this way to
encode the final common secret key. Alternatively, one can perform a truly multipartite QKD scheme
–also known as conference key agreement (CKA)– whose purpose is to deliver the same secret key to all
the parties involved in the protocol [34–38]. In order to accomplish such a task, a resource which seems
necessary is the multipartite Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state [34–37] or a multipartite private
state –a “twisted” version of the GHZ state [39,40].
In this work we introduce a CKA which exploits for the first time the multipartite entanglement of a
W -class state [41], in order to deliver the same secret key to all users. Despite having a number of
users involved, the scheme relies on single-photon interference in an untrusted node and it is inspired by
the bipartite TF-QKD protocol by Curty et al. [24]. We prove the security of our CKA in the finite-
key scenario, allowing Eve to perform the most general attacks (coherent attacks) on the transmitted
signals. We compare the performance of our genuinely multipartite QKD scheme with the iterative use
of bipartite QKD protocols, both in the asymptotic regime and in the finite-key regime. In doing so, we
show that performing a truly multipartite scheme can yield a higher secret key rate, depending on the
loss and on the state preparation.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 1 we present the CKA based on single-photon interference,
while in Sec. 2 we discuss the establishment of a secret conference key where the entanglement resource
is a W state. In Sec. 3 we prove the CKA security in the finite-key scenario (the detailed proof is given in
Appendix A). In Sec. 4 we provide simulations of the protocol’s secret key rate and compare them with
the repeated use of bipartite schemes (further comparisons in Appendix C). We present our conclusions
in Sec. 5. In Appendix B we report in detail the calculations of the relevant parameters for an honest
implementation of the protocol.
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1. Conference key agreement
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Fig. 1: The CKA based on single-photon interference in the untrusted central node and on trusted measurements
performed on each party’s (Alicei) qubit.
As anticipated in the introduction, our CKA scheme is an extension of the original bipartite TF-QKD
protocol [24, Protocol 1] to a scenario with N users who want to establish a secret conference key. The
parties distill the secret key by sending optical pulses to an untrusted node and by performing suitable
measurements on a qubit they hold. In order to keep the notation symmetric, the N parties involved in
the multipartite QKD protocol are named: Alice1, Alice2, . . . , AliceN . The protocol is composed of L
rounds, each round is characterized by the following seven steps (see figure 1):
(i) Every party (Alicei) prepares an optical pulse ai in an entangled state with a qubit Ai, given by:
|φ〉Aiai =
√
q|0〉Ai |0〉ai +
√
1− q|1〉Ai |1〉ai ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} , (1.1)
where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, |0〉ai is the vacuum state, |1〉ai is the single-photon state, and {|0〉Ai , |1〉Ai} is the
computational basis of qubit Ai.
(ii) Every party sends her optical pulse ai to the untrusted node via optical channels characterized by
transmittance t, in a synchronized manner.
(iii) The central node applies a Bell-multiport beam splitter [42–47] with M input and output ports‡ to
the incoming pulses and features a threshold detector Di at each output port (i = 1, . . . ,M). The
action of the multiport beam splitter is defined by the unitary transformation given in figure 1.
(iv) The central node announces the measurement outcome ki for every detector Di, with ki = 0 and
ki = 1 corresponding to a no-click and a click event, respectively. The round gets discarded if∑M
i=1 ki 6= 1, i.e. whenever single-photon interference did not occur in the central node. The
probability that only detector Dj clicked is pj .
(v) According to a preshared secret key of L · h(pPE) bits§, the round is classified as a parameter-
estimation (PE) round with probability pPE or as a key-generation (KG) round with probability
1− pPE. There are on average m = MpjLpPE PE rounds that do not get discarded.
(a) In case of a PE round, every party measures her qubit in the Z-basis and then announces the
measurement outcome to compute the frequency: QmZ = (1 + 〈Z⊗N 〉m)/2.
‡ We assume that there are at least as many input ports of the beam splitter as parties taking part to the protocol, i.e.
M ≥ N .
§ Where h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary entropy function.
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(b) In case of a KG round, conditioned on detectorDj clicking, Alicei measures her qubit in the basis
of the operator OXY (ϕi) = cosϕiX + sinϕiY (where X and Y are the Pauli operators), with
ϕi = arg(Uij) (Uij is given in figure 1). The parties announce m randomly chosen measurement
results in order to estimate the quantum bit error rate (QBER) by computing the frequency:
QmA1Ai = (1− 〈OXY (ϕ1)OXY (ϕi)〉m)/2, i.e. the frequency of discordant outcomes.
(vi) The secret key shared by the N users is extracted from the remaining n = MpjL− 2m raw key bits
of the KG rounds.
(vii) The parties perform classical post-processing and correct their errors to match Alice1’s raw key.
Remarks. Note that the quantity QmZ is the frequency of the outcome +1 when the parties measure the
operator Z⊗N . By making an analogy with the bipartite scenario, one can view QmZ as an estimation of
the phase-error rate between Alice1 and the other N − 1 parties (when the phase-error rate is defined as
in [24]).
Since the Bell-multiport beam splitter redirects each incoming photon with equal probability to each
potential output port, the probability of having a click in only one specific detector is the same for all
detectors, i.e. pj reads the same for j = 1, . . . ,M . For this reason, the total probability of having exactly
one click in any detector is given by Mpj .
In an honest implementation of the protocol, where the parties’ state preparation and the operations of
the central node are carried out as described above, the state of the qubits A1, . . . , AN from which
the parties distill a secret key is approximately a W -class state of N qubits [41], as we show in
Sec. 2. Therefore, the protocol here introduced represents an alternative to other multipartite QKD
protocols [34–37] where the entanglement resource used to generate the key is, instead, a noisy version of
the GHZ state of N qubits. Moreover, the W -class state used by the CKA is an entangled state which is
post-selected after the interference of one single photon at the multiport beam splitter. Thus the resulting
key rate scales linearly with the transmittance t of one of the quantum channels linking the parties to
the central node. This is in contrast to the other mentioned multipartite QKD protocols [34–37], where
the distribution of an N -qubit GHZ state (e.g. encoded in orthogonal polarizations of a photon) would
lead to a key rate which scales with tN (with t being the transmittance of the link between one party
and the node distributing the GHZ state). This makes our CKA much more suited to high-loss scenarios
than previously proposed multipartite QKD protocols.
2. Multipartite QKD with a W state
As mentioned at the end of Sec. 1, the entanglement resource exploited to distill the secret key is a noisy
W -class state of N qubits [41], which is post-selected after single-photon interference occurred in the
central node. In fact, the optimization of the CKA key rate (Sec. 4) over the parameter q weighting
the initial superposition of the qubit-photon state always yields values of q close to 1. This means that
the quantum signal sent by the parties is strongly unbalanced towards the vacuum. Thus the events in
which one of the detectors clicks are mainly caused by the arrival and detection of one photon. However,
because of the balanced superposition generated by the multiport beam splitter, the detected photon
could be sent by any party with equal probability. Since the photon is initially entangled to the qubit
in state |1〉, the qubits’ state conditioned on the detection is a coherent superposition of states in which
one qubit is in state |1〉 and all the others are in state |0〉, that is the mentioned W -class state. A secret
conference key can then be extracted by proper measurements performed on such a state.
Let’s start by considering the simplistic scenario in which the parties share the N -partite W state:
|W 〉N =
1√
N
[|00 . . . 01〉+ |00 . . . 10〉+ . . .+ |10 . . . 00〉] . (2.1)
It has been proven [34] that the parties cannot extract perfectly correlated outcomes in any set of local
measurement bases (for N ≥ 3). Indeed, the only N -qubit state achieving that and yielding uniformly
distributed random measurement outcomes is the GHZ state. Nevertheless, the N -partite W state can
still be used to extract a secret conference key. The key bits are given by the outcomes of the X-basis
measurements performed by the N parties on their respective qubit. The expected QBER between any
two parties is given by 1/2−1/N , which amounts to subtracting the fraction h(1/2−1/N) from the secret
key rate due to error correction (h(x) is the binary entropy). On the other hand, the eavesdropper’s
knowledge about the key can be estimated via the phase-error rate QZ (as defined in Sec. 1, more details
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in Appendix A), which turns out to be zero on the W state. This is crucial for having a non-zero key
rate even when the number of parties is large. The resulting asymptotic key rate, when the parties share
an N -partite W state, is given by 1− h(1/2− 1/N).
Our CKA is constructed following the same philosophy. The only difference is that the conditional state
shared by the parties after the detector’s click is not exactly the W state given by (2.1), but rather a
noisy W -class state (the full expression is given in Appendix B). Indeed, the multiport beam splitter
introduces complex phases in the balanced superposition of states shared by the parties, that depend on
which detector clicked. For this reason, we require the parties to adjust their KG measurements in the
X,Y plane in order to remove such phases and obtain the same QBER they would observe by measuring
in the X-basis had they shared the standard W state (2.1). However, the adjusted KG measurements do
not commute with the operations performed in the untrusted node and prevent the CKA to be recast as an
MDI prepare-and-measure scheme, opposed to its bipartite version [24]. Consequently, the multipartite
scheme presented here is more challenging to implement than its bipartite counterpart. Nonetheless,
the operations that the parties are required to perform seem to be within technological reach [48, 49].
In particular, the qubit system could be realized by a nitrogen-vacancy electron spin, whose coherence
time has recently reached the order of seconds [50]. The entanglement between the electron spin and the
photon’s Fock state would then be generated via selective optical pulses and coherent rotations [48].
3. Finite-key analysis
The protocol presented in Sec. 1 can be effectively regarded as an N -partite QKD protocol solely
characterized by the unknown quantum state ρ
MpjL
A1A2...AN
, which is the global state of the parties’ qubits
in all the rounds that were not discarded‖. In this way we allow the eavesdropper, who is in total
control of the untrusted node, to perform any kind of operation (coherent attacks) on the whole set
of signals sent by the parties in the different rounds. As described above, in each round the parties
perform trusted measurements on the state ρ
MpjL
A1A2...AN
, according to the preshared key they hold. The
security of such a multipartite QKD protocol can be proven thanks to the finite-key analysis developed
in [36]. In particular, since Alice1 (who holds the key to which all the other parties correct their raw
key) measures her qubit only in the two mutually unbiased bases Z and X, the protocol’s security proof
follows analogous lines to the one of the N -BB84 protocol presented in [36]. The detailed proof of the
CKA security is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 The CKA in Sec. 1, with the optimal 1-way error-correction protocol (which is εEC-fully
secure and 2(N − 1)εPE -robust) and where the secret key generated by two-universal hashing has length
`(N) = n
[
1− h (QmZ + γ(n,m,QmZ , εz))−max
i
h
(
QmA1Ai + γ(n,m,Q
m
A1Ai , εx)
)]− log2 2(N − 1)εEC
− 2 log2
1− 2(N − 1)εPE
2 εPA
, (3.1)
is εtot-secure with εtot = 2εPE + εEC + εPA, where εPE is defined as:
εPE ≡
√
(N − 1)εx + εz (3.2)
and γ(n,m,Λm, ε) is the positive root of the following equation:
ln
(
n(Λm + γ) +mΛm
mΛm
)
+ ln
(
(n+m)(1− Λm)− nγ
m(1− Λm)
)
= ln
(
n+m
m
)
+ ln ε . (3.3)
We remark that the length L ·h(pPE) of the preshared key must be subtracted from the secret key length
in order to have the net amount of fresh secret key bits. We also remark that our leakage estimation
considers the worst-case QBER affecting the parties’ raw keys, which is (with high probability) not larger
than the QBER observed in appositely designated KG rounds with the appropriate statistical correction.
This is in contrast to several other finite-key analyses [51–54], where either the QBER is assumed to be
known a priori or its estimation does not account for statistical fluctuations.
In the asymptotic regime (L→∞), the finite-size effects are not present and the secret key rate (r = `/L)
reads:
r(N) = Mpj
[
1− h(QZ)− max
i∈{1,...,N}
h(QA1Ai)
]
, (3.4)
where QZ and QA1Ai are the probabilities correspondent to the frequencies defined in Sec. 1.
‖ On average, the number of rounds that are not discarded by the CKA is MpjL.
4
4. Simulations
In this Section we provide plots of the secret key rate –number of secret key bits per round– achieved by
the CKA both with finite-key effects (3.1) and in the asymptotic regime (3.4), as a function of the loss
in one of the channels linking a party to the central node, measured in dB (−10 log10 t). We assume that
the protocol is honestly implemented as described in Sec. 1 and we account for a dark count probability
of pd = 10
−9 in every detector (which can be attained with superconducting nanowire single photon
detectors [29]) and for a polarization and a phase misalignment between Alice1 and each other party
of 2%. The relevant error rates and probabilities for this configuration are given in Appendix B. The
plots are optimized over the parameter q of the initial superposition between the two qubit-photon states,
unless otherwise stated. The finite-key plots are further optimized over the probability pPE of performing
a PE round and over the security parameters εx, εz, εEC and εPA, constrained by a fixed total security
parameter of εtot = 10
−8.
In order to assess the performance of our CKA with an untrusted node, we consider the situation in which
the central node is removed and the N parties are linked by a star network, where the transmittance
of the link between any two parties is t2. For this configuration, we consider the conference key rate
generated by the following strategy and compare it to our CKA key rate. One selected party performs
the best possible bipartite QKD scheme with every other party in the network, i.e. N−1 times. Because
of the network symmetry, every bipartite secret key has the same length and its asymptotic rate is upper
bounded by the Pirandola-Laurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) bound [33] given by: − log2(1−t2). Then,
the selected party encodes the final conference key by using the keys she/he established singularly with
each other party. Hence, the conference key length is equal to the bipartite keys’ lengths, but the total
number of rounds¶ needed to establish the conference key is given by the number of rounds performed
by a pair of parties, multiplied by the number of bipartite schemes (N − 1). Thus the conference key
rate achieved by this strategy is upper bounded by:
rdirect(N) =
− log2(1− t2)
N − 1 . (4.1)
We will refer to (4.1) as the direct-transmission bound, even though we emphasize that it only upper
bounds the achievable conference key rate when the strategy we just described is employed. Indeed, we
do not claim that this strategy yields the highest possible conference key rate for the considered network
configuration. In this Section we show that our CKA provides an advantage, in terms of performance,
with respect to the above strategy (4.1).
4.1. Asymptotic regime
In figure 2 we plot the asymptotic key rate of the CKA (Eq. 3.4, solid and dotted lines) as a function of
the loss in one of the quantum channels, for different number parties establishing the secret conference
key. In particular, the solid lines are obtained by fixing M = N , i.e. the number of input (output) ports
of the beam splitter is given by the number of parties taking part to the protocol. The dotted lines
are instead obtained by fixing the number of ports to M = 10. Finally, the dashed lines represent the
direct-transmission bound (4.1) for the correspondent number of parties.
We observe that the CKA key rate can surpass the direct-transmission bound for sufficiently high losses.
This is expected since the CKA key rate basically scales linearly with the transmittance t of the quantum
channel linking one party to the central node, while the direct-transmission rate scales linearly with the
transmittance (t2) of the whole channel linking two parties [33]. We note, however, that the performance
advantage of the CKA with respect to the direct-transmission bound decreases for increasing number
of parties. This is due to the fact that an increase of the number of parties is more detrimental for
the CKA rate, as it severely affects the QBER, than for the direct-transmission bound, where it simply
increases the total number of rounds dividing the key length. Moreover, the presence of dark counts
in the detectors prevents the CKA from outperforming the direct-transmission bound if the number of
parties is too large (see the N = 9 case in figure 2). As a matter of fact, for increasing number of parties
the key rate optimization yields a lower probability of having a single click in one of the detectors, thus
increasing the relative effect of dark counts.
From figure 2 we also deduce that performing the CKA with a higher number of ports in the beam
¶ By round we mean a set of steps of a given QKD protocol which contains only one transmission of quantum signals
(more parties at the same time can transmit a quantum signal).
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Fig. 2: The CKA key rate (Eq. 3.4, solid and dotted lines) and the direct-transmission bound (Eq. 4.1, dashed lines),
as a function of the loss in the channel linking one party to the central node, for different number of parties
N = 2, 3, 5 and 9 (black, blue, red and green; top to bottom). The CKA key rate overcomes the correspondent
direct-transmission bound for increasing losses, as the number of parties increases. For instance, the CKA
performed by 5 parties becomes advantageous at distances larger than 150 km (assuming a fiber attenuation
of α = 0.2 dB/km). We also observe that having more ports in the beam splitter than parties involved in
the protocol is advantageous at low losses (dotted lines are above the solid lines) but disadvantageous at high
losses, where more ports imply a higher chance of having a dark count.
splitter (dotted lines, where M = 10) is advantageous at low losses and disadvantageous at high losses.
The advantage of having more output ports is that the probability that two photons arrive at the same
detector diminishes (this is an error source in our CKA). However, these errors could only occur if there
is a non-negligible probability that two photons arrive at the central node, i.e. when the losses are low.
At the same time, the presence of more output ports –and thus detectors– increases the chances of a
dark count. And the negative effect of dark counts on the performance becomes tangible when their
probability is comparable to the probability of having a click in a detector, i.e. at high losses.
Another relevant scenario for assessing the CKA performance in comparison to the iteration of bipartite
protocols could be the following. The parties are given the same CKA experimental setup but they
are now allowed to use it in pairs (or larger subgroups) in consecutive runs, effectively performing the
original TF-QKD protocol [24, Protocol 1] between one selected party and every other party. The different
established keys are then used to encode the final conference key, similarly to the direct-transmission
scenario. This strategy can then be compared to the case where the parties choose to use the CKA setup
all at once, thus performing a truly multipartite QKD scheme. A detailed analysis of this comparison in
the asymptotic regime is given in Appendix C. It turns out that, depending on the loss and on the state
preparation, it is still advantageous to perform a multipartite protocol instead of iteratively executing
bipartite protocols, on the CKA experimental setup.
4.2. Finite-key effects
In figure 3a we plot the finite-key conference rate (Eq. 3.1 divided by L) as a function of the number of
rounds L, for different fixed values of the loss (20dB and 30dB, solid and dot-dashed lines) and different
number of parties. We stress the fact that we normalize the key length to the total number of rounds
(L), i.e. we also take into account the rounds that get discarded due to double-clicks or no click in the
detectors. The horizontal dashed lines correspond to the value of the direct-transmission bound (4.1) for
the various combinations of losses and number of parties. We observe that the number of rounds leading
to a non-zero key rate is in general higher than other multipartite schemes (see for example [36]). This
is caused by the fact that the CKA devised here relies on single-photon interference events, which are
only a fraction of all the events occurring in an experiment run. A considerable amount of rounds gets
thus discarded, but still contributes to the rounds’ count. Nevertheless, the number of rounds needed for
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(a) Finite-key conference rate (Eq. 3.1 over L) as a
function of the number of rounds L, for fixed losses
of 20 dB (solid lines) and 30 dB (dot-dashed lines),
and different number of parties: N = 2, 3 and 5
(black, blue and red; top to bottom). We observe
that the rates quickly achieve their asymptotic value
once the number of non-discarded rounds is enough
to get a non-zero key. The CKA key rates overcome
the direct-transmission bound (dashed lines) even in
the finite-key scenario.
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Fig. 3: Here we study the finite-key effects on our CKA. The number of ports in the beam splitter is given by the
number of parties taking part to the protocol: M = N .
a non-zero key rate is comparable to other bipartite TF-QKD protocols [55,56]. On the other hand, the
advantage of relying on single-photon interference in a multipartite scenario is the excellent scaling of the
protocol’s key rate with respect to losses, which allows it to overcome the asymptotic direct-transmission
bound (dashed lines) even with a finite number of rounds.
In figure 3b we instead plot the minimum number of rounds (Lmin) such that the finite-key rate (`/L)
does not decrease more than 90% with respect to its asymptotic value r (3.4), i.e.: `(Lmin)/Lmin ≥ r/10.
The threshold Lmin is plotted as a function of the number of parties (N) and for fixed values of the loss.
We observe that Lmin increases both with the number of parties and with the loss. The reason is that, in
both cases, the fraction of the total number of rounds that gets discarded increases. This has a negative
effect both on the asymptotic rate and on the finite-key rate, however the effect on the latter is greater,
thus requiring a larger number of rounds Lmin to maintain the finite-key rate within 90% range of the
asymptotic one. Indeed, a larger fraction of discarded rounds decreases the prefactor Mpj in both the
finite- and the asymptotic-key rates, but it additionally decreases the number of rounds used for PE in
the finite-key regime. This causes larger statistical fluctuations and thus a smaller finite-key rate.
5. Conclusions
In this work we introduced a new multipartite QKD protocol that exploits for the first time the
correlations derived from an N -partite W state [41] to establish a secret conference key among the
N users. In an honest implementation of the protocol, the W state is post-selected thanks to the
interference of a single photon in a central node, extending the idea of the bipartite Twin-Field QKD
protocol devised in [24] to the multipartite scenario. Hence the resulting key rate scales linearly with
the transmittance of one of the quantum channels linking the parties to the central node, making the
protocol particularly suited for conference keys established in high-loss scenarios.
We prove the protocol’s security in the finite-key regime by considering the most adversarial situation
possible, i.e. coherent attacks are allowed by the eavesdropper. In order to achieve this, we rely on
previous results on the finite-key security of multipartite QKD schemes derived in [36] and employ the
entropic uncertainty relation [57].
We provide simulations of the conference key rate both in the finite- and in the asymptotic-key regime.
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We compare the performance of our conference key agreement (CKA) to that achieved by performing
bipartite QKD schemes between one party and each of the others and then using the established keys to
encode the conference key. In particular, we analyze the cases where the bipartite schemes are performed
with the same setup used for the CKA (in Appendix C) and in the direct-transmission scenario (i.e. the
central node is removed and the optimal bipartite QKD scheme is performed). We show that, in both
cases, the execution of a truly multipartite scheme could be advantageous even when finite-key effects
are accounted for.
Although the feasibility of the proposed CKA requires further investigation, with this work we
demonstrate that, in principle, multipartite QKD does not necessarily need a GHZ-class state as its
entanglement resource and that it can be implemented even in high-loss scenarios.
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Appendix A. Security proof
In order to prove the security of our CKA in the finite-key scenario, we start from the general security
statement given in [36, Theorem 1]. The resulting secret key length is thus determined by the amount
of information the eavesdropper has about the secret key and by the information the parties leak during
the classical post-processing. The former is quantified by the min-entropy Hεmin(ρ
n
XE |E), where ρnXE
is the classical-quantum state of Alice1’s raw key and the eavesdropper’s quantum system E which is
partially correlated to it. Since the eavesdropper’s system is unknown, one cannot directly compute the
mentioned min-entropy. Nevertheless, it can be bounded by means of the uncertainty relation [57] as
follows:
Hεmin(ρ
n
XE |E) ≥ n−Hεmax(ρnZ1...ZN |Z2 . . . ZN ) , (A.1)
where the max-entropy on the r.h.s. quantifies the uncertainty of Alice1’s Z-measurement results when
the Z-outcomes of the remaining N−1 parties are known, if all parties would measure Z in the n rounds
yielding the raw-key. The max-entropy can be upper bounded via the phase-error rate QnZ –as defined
in Sec. 1– of the n raw-key rounds. We get:
Hεmin(ρ
n
XE |E) ≥ n− nh(QnZ) , (A.2)
where h(·) is the binary entropy function: h(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x). Finally, since the
parties do not directly observe the phase-error rate QnZ of the n rounds producing the raw key, this can
be inferred through the theory of random sampling without replacement. In particular, the phase-error
rate of the raw key (QnZ) can be upper bounded with high probability, once the observed phase-error
rate (QmZ ) is known. For this, we make use of the following tail inequality [55, Lemma 1] which features
a tighter bound with respect to the Serfling inequality.
Lemma 1 [55]. Let Xn+m be a random binary string of n+m bits, Xm be a random sample (without
replacement) of m entries from the string Xn+m and Xn be the remaining bit string. Upon calling Λm
and Λn the frequencies of bit value 1 in string Xm and Xn, respectively, for any ε > 0 it holds:
Pr[Λn ≤ Λm + γ(n,m,Λm, ε)] > 1− ε , (A.3)
where γ(n,m,Λm, ε) is the positive root of the following equation:
ln
(
n(Λm + γ) +mΛm
mΛm
)
+ ln
(
(n+m)(1− Λm)− nγ
m(1− Λm)
)
= ln
(
n+m
m
)
+ ln ε . (A.4)
By applying Lemma 1 to the case of QnZ , we can finally bound the eavesdropper knowledge about the
secret key as follows:
Hεmin(ρ
n
XE |E) ≥ n− nh (QmZ + γ(n,m,QmZ , εz)) . (A.5)
The remaining part of the secret key length that needs to be estimated is the leaked information during
classical post-processing. This is readily estimated through the observed QBER between Alice1 and any
other party, by means of [36, Theorem 2].
Putting these considerations together, we obtain the security statement given in Th. 1.
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Appendix B. Channel model
In this Section we compute the QBER (QA1Ak), the phase-error rate (QZ) and the probability that
a given detector clicked (pj), assuming that the protocol is implemented as described in Sec. 1. We
also account for a dark count probability pd in each detector and we consider the specific scenario in
which there are a polarization and a phase misalignment of angles θ and φ, respectively, between Alice1
and each other party. In the simulations of Sec. 4 we set: pd = 10
−9 and θ = φ = arcsin
√
0.02. For
simplicity, we assume that the input signals of the N parties enter the first N ports of the M -port beam
splitter. Nevertheless, the results in terms of achieved key rate are independent of which input ports are
used, thanks to the balanced redistribution of the input photons to the output ports of the considered
Bell-multiport beam splitter (see figure 1). We remark that the expressions derived here together with
the asymptotic key rate given in (3.4) reproduce those of the original TF-QKD protocol [24, Protocol 1]
in the case of two parties (N = 2) with a balanced 2-port beam splitter (M = 2).
We first derive the QBER, the phase-error rate and the probability pj assuming no dark counts in the
detectors, i.e. every click is caused by the arrival of one or more photons. In the last Subsection we use
the derived expressions to obtain analogous quantities, with the assumption that every detector has a
probability pd of clicking conditioned on no photon arriving.
Appendix B.1. Qubits’ state conditioned on one click
According to the protocol, the global state of the parties’ qubits and signals, before sending the signals
to the central node, reads:
|Φ1〉 =
N⊗
k=1
|φ〉Akak =
N⊗
k=1
(√
q|0〉Ak |0〉ak +
√
1− qeiφk |1〉Aka
†
k|0〉ak
)
, (B.1)
where the phase mismatch φk is defined as zero if k = 1 and as φ if k 6= 1, which means that every other
party has the same phase mismatch with respect to Alice1. The signals ak are then sent to the central
node through lossy optical channels, which are modeled as beam splitters with transmittance t. The
global state after the transmission of the signals to the untrusted relay reads:
|Φ2〉 =
N⊗
k=1
[√
q|0〉Ak |0〉+
√
1− qeiφk |1〉Ak(
√
t a†k +
√
1− t l†k)|0〉
]
=
2N−1∑
g(~b)=0
q
N−|~b|
2 (1− q) |
~b|
2 |~b〉A1...AN ⊗Nk=1 eibkφk(
√
t a†k +
√
1− t l†k)bk |0〉 , (B.2)
where l†k is the creation operator of the lost photon in channel k, ~b is a N -bit vector that runs from 0 to
2N −1 in binary notation (covering all the possible combinations of qubit states) and |~b| is the Hamming
weight of vector ~b. From now on, we denote as g(·) the bijective function that takes as input a binary
vector and outputs the correspondent decimal number.
We assume now that the polarization of the photons sent by Alice2, . . .AliceN is rotated by an angle θ
with respect to Alice1’s signal:
|Φ3〉 =
2N−1∑
g(~b)=0
q
N−|~b|
2 (1− q) |
~b|
2 |~b〉A1...AN ⊗Nk=1 eibkφk(
√
t cos θka
†
k,P −
√
t sin θka
†
k,P⊥ +
√
1− t l†k)bk |0〉 ,(B.3)
where θk is defined as zero if k = 1 and as θ if k 6= 1, while the subscripts P and P⊥ indicate the
polarization of Alice1’s signal and its orthogonal direction, respectively.
Finally, the global state after the application of the Bell-multiport beam splitter on the incoming signals
(its action on the incoming creation operators is reported in figure 1) is:
|Φ4〉 =
2N−1∑
g(~b)=0
q
N−|~b|
2 (1− q) |
~b|
2 |~b〉A1...AN
⊗
N∏
k=1
eibkφk(
√
t cos θk
∑M
j=1 Ukjσ
†
j,P −
√
t sin θk
∑M
j=1 Ukjσ
†
j,P⊥ +
√
1− t l†k)bk |0〉 , (B.4)
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where σ†j,P and σ
†
j,P⊥ are the creation operators of the output signals in the two orthogonal polarizations
and Ukj is reported in figure 1. At this point, every output signal is measured in the respective threshold
detector. Since the detectors do not distinguish the polarization of the output signals, we will use
the subscript σj to indicate the combined Hilbert space of the signals exiting port j, when there is no
ambiguity.
We are now ready to compute the conditional state of the qubits A1, . . . , AN when only detector Dj
clicked:
pjρ
j
A1...AN
= Trσ1,...,σM
l1,...,lN
[
(idσj − P|0〉σj )⊗i6=j P|0〉σi |Φ4〉〈Φ4|(idσj − P|0〉σj )⊗i 6=j P|0〉σi
]
(B.5)
where pj is the probability that only detector Dj clicked, ρ
j
A1...AN
is the normalized conditional state of
the qubits and P|0〉σj is the projector on the vacuum state of output signal j. In order to compute (B.5),
we start by calculating the following quantity:
(idσj − P|0〉σj )⊗i 6=j P|0〉σi |Φ4〉 =
2N−1∑
g(~b)=1
q
N−|~b|
2 (1− q) |
~b|
2 |~b〉A1...AN
⊗ (idσj − P|0〉σj )⊗i 6=j P|0〉σi
N∏
k=1
eibkφk
[√
tUkj
(
cos θkσ
†
j,P − sin θkσ†j,P⊥
)
+
√
1− t l†k
]bk |0〉
≡
2N−1∑
g(~b)=1
q
N−|~b|
2 (1− q) |
~b|
2 |~b〉A1...AN ⊗ (idσj − P|0〉σj )⊗i 6=j P|0〉σi |ψ〉σj ,l (B.6)
where the effect of the projectors is to select the outcome signal σj and to remove the case g(~b) = 0,
since it would correspond to a vacuum state for the outcome signal σj . We now focus on rewriting the
following term:
|ψ〉σj ,l =
N∏
k=1
eibkφk
[√
tUkj
(
cos θkσ
†
j,P − sin θkσ†j,P⊥
)
+
√
1− t l†k
]bk |0〉 =
ei(|~b|−b1)φ
2N−1∑
g(~d)=0 s.t.
~d∧~b=~d
N∏
k=1
[√
t Ukj
(
cos θkσ
†
j,P − sin θkσ†j,P⊥
)]dk (√
1− t l†k
)(~b⊕~d)k |0〉 (B.7)
= ei(|~b|−b1)φ
2N−1∑
g(~d)=0 s.t.
~d∧~b=~d
ei
2pi
M (j−1)
∑N
k=1 dk(k−1)
(√
t
M
)|~d|
(
√
1− t)|~b⊕~d|
×
N∏
k=1
(
cos θkσ
†
j,P − sin θkσ†j,P⊥
)dk |0〉 ⊗ |~b⊕ ~d〉l1,...,lN , (B.8)
where we expanded the product in the first line of (B.7) by introducing a sum over the binary vector ~d.
The sum runs over all the N -bit vectors ~d for which dk = 0 whenever bk = 0, for all k –the condition
dk ∧ bk = dk ∀ k. This is to make sure that the k-th factor in the first line does not contribute to the
expanded product in the second line whenever bk = 0. The remaining bits of ~d that are not affected by
the mentioned condition, can be either 1 or 0. If dk = 1 we intend that, for this particular term in the
sum, the contribution of the k-th factor in the first line of (B.7) is given by its first addend (
√
t Ukj(. . .)).
While if dk = 0 and bk = 1, we mean that the contribution is coming from the second addend (
√
1− t l†k).
The exponents in the second line of (B.7) are chosen according to these rules. Finally, (B.8) is obtained
by using the definition of Ukj from figure 1 and by applying the creation operators on the vacuum. We
now expand the remaining product in (B.8) with the same technique and obtain the following expression:
|ψ〉σj ,l = ei(|
~b|−b1)φ
2N−1∑
g(~d)=0 s.t.
~d∧~b=~d
ei
2pi
M (j−1)
∑N
k=1 dk(k−1)
(√
t
M
)|~d|
(
√
1− t)|~b⊕~d|
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×
2N−1∑
g(~f)=0 s.t.
~f∧~d=~f
N∏
k=1
(cos θk)
fk(− sin θk)(~d⊕~f)k
√
|~f |!
√
|~d⊕ ~f |! ||~f |〉σj ,P ⊗ ||~d⊕ ~f |〉σj ,P⊥ ⊗ |~b⊕ ~d〉l1,...,lN
= ei(|~b|−b1)φ
2N−1∑
g(~d)=0 s.t.
~d∧~b=~d
ei
2pi
M (j−1)
∑N
k=1 dk(k−1)
(√
t
M
)|~d|
(
√
1− t)|~b⊕~d|
×
2N−1∑
g(~f)=0 s.t.
~f∧~d=~f
(cos θ)|~f |−f1(− sin θ)|~d⊕~f |δ(~d⊕~f)1,0
√
|~f |!
√
|~d⊕ ~f |! ||~f |〉σj ,P ⊗ ||~d⊕ ~f |〉σj ,P⊥ ⊗ |~b⊕ ~d〉l1,...,lN(B.9)
We now substitute (B.9) back into (B.6) and note that the effect of the projectors (idσj−P|0〉σj )⊗i 6=jP|0〉σi
is to remove the case g(~d) = 0 from (B.9). Hence we get:
(idσj − P|0〉σj )⊗i 6=j P|0〉σi |Φ4〉 =
2N−1∑
g(~b)=1
q
N−|~b|
2 (1− q) |
~b|
2 ei(|~b|−b1)φ|~b〉A1...AN ⊗
2N−1∑
g(~d)=1 s.t.
~d∧~b=~d
ei
2pi
M (j−1)
∑N
k=1 dk(k−1)
(√
t
M
)|~d|
(
√
1− t)|~b⊕~d|
×
2N−1∑
g(~f)=0:f1=d1
~f∧~d=~f
(cos θ)|~f |−f1(− sin θ)|~d⊕~f |
√
|~f |!
√
|~d⊕ ~f |! ||~f |〉σj ,P ⊗ ||~d⊕ ~f |〉σj ,P⊥ ⊗ |~b⊕ ~d〉l1,...,lN . (B.10)
By substituting (B.10) into (B.5) we finally get the state of the qubits conditioned on Dj clicking:
pjρ
j
A1...AN
=
2N−1∑
g(~b),g(~b′)=1
qN−
|~b|+|~b′|
2 (1− q) |
~b|+|~b′|
2 ei[|~b|−|~b
′|−(b1−b′1)]φ|~b〉〈~b′|
×
2N−1∑
g(~d),g(~d′)=1 : ~d∧~b=~d
~d′∧~b′=~d′
ei
2pi
M (j−1)
∑N
k=1(k−1)(dk−d′k)
(√
t
M
)|~d|+|~d′|
(
√
1− t)|~b⊕~d|+|~b′⊕~d′|
×
2N−1∑
g(~f)=0:f1=d1
~f∧~d=~f
2N−1∑
g( ~f′)=0:f′1=d′1
~f′∧~d′= ~f′
(cos θ)|~f |+|~f
′|−f1−f ′1(− sin θ)|~d⊕~f |+|~d′⊕~f ′|
×
√
|~f |! |~f ′|! |~d⊕ ~f |! |~d′ ⊕ ~f ′|! δ|~f |,|~f ′| δ|~d⊕~f |,|~d′⊕~f ′| δ~b⊕~d,~b′⊕~d′ . (B.11)
We use the Kronecker deltas to reduce the sums over ~d, ~d′, ~f and ~f ′. The third delta fixes the value of ~d′:
~d′ = ~b⊕ ~b′⊕ ~d. The fixed value of ~d′ combined with the other constraints on this vector imply additional
constraints on ~d. In particular, ~d′ 6= 0 implies ~d 6= ~b ⊕ ~b′ while ~d′ ∧ ~b′ = ~d′ implies ~b′ ∧ (~b ⊕ ~d) = ~b ⊕ ~d.
Finally the first two deltas imply |~d|= |~d′|, which combined with the third delta yields |~b|= |~b′|. Putting
everything together allows to simplify (B.11) as follows:
pjρ
j
A1...AN
=
2N−1∑
g(~b),g(~b′)=1
|~b′|=|~b|
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|ei[(b′1−b1)]φ|~b〉〈~b′|
∑
~d∈D(~b,~b′)
ei
2pi
M (j−1)
∑N
k=1(k−1)(dk−bk⊕dk⊕b′k)
×
(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
2N−1∑
~f∈F(~d)
2N−1∑
~f ′∈F ′(~f,~d,~b,~b′)
|~f |! (|~d|−|~f |)! (cos θ)2|~f |−d1−d1⊕b1⊕b′1(sin θ)2(|~d|−|~f |) . (B.12)
where the sets of binary vectors D(~b, ~b′), F(~d) and F ′(~f, ~d,~b, ~b′) are defined as follows:
D(~b, ~b′) = {~d ∈ g−1([1, 2N − 1]) : ~d ∧~b = ~d, ~d 6= ~b⊕ ~b′, (~b⊕ ~d) ∧ ~b′ = ~b⊕ ~d} (B.13)
F(~d) = {~f ∈ g−1([0, 2N − 1]) : ~f ∧ ~d = ~f, f1 = d1} (B.14)
F ′(~f, ~d,~b, ~b′) = {~f ′ ∈ g−1([0, 2N − 1]) : ~f ′ ∧ (~b⊕ ~d⊕ ~b′) = ~f ′, f ′1 = b1 ⊕ d1 ⊕ b′1, |~f ′|= |~f |} . (B.15)
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We can now sum over the vectors ~f ′ since no term depends on them in (B.12):
pjρ
j
A1...AN
=
2N−1∑
g(~b),g(~b′)=1
|~b′|=|~b|
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|ei[(b′1−b1)]φ|~b〉〈~b′|
∑
~d∈D(~b,~b′)
ei
2pi
M (j−1)
∑N
k=1(k−1)(dk−bk⊕dk⊕b′k)
(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
×
2N−1∑
~f∈F(~d)
(|~b⊕ ~d⊕ ~b′|−b1 ⊕ d1 ⊕ b′1
|~f |−b1 ⊕ d1 ⊕ b′1
)∗
|~f |! (|~d|−|~f |)! (cos θ)2|~f |−d1−d1⊕b1⊕b′1(sin θ)2(|~d|−|~f |) , (B.16)
where the asterisk on the binomial coefficient means that it is defined as zero if |~f |= 0 and b1⊕d1⊕b′1 = 1.
Finally, since every term just depends on |~f |, we can sum over all the vectors ~f with equal Hamming
weight and obtain the final expression for the conditional state of the qubits when detector Dj clicked:
pjρ
j
A1...AN
=
2N−1∑
g(~b),g(~b′)=1
|~b′|=|~b|
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|ei[(b′1−b1)]φ|~b〉〈~b′|
∑
~d∈D(~b,~b′)
ei
2pi
M (j−1)
∑N
k=1(k−1)(dk−bk⊕dk⊕b′k)
(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
×
|~d|∑
m=d1
( |~d|−d1
m− d1
)(|~b⊕ ~d⊕ ~b′|−b1 ⊕ d1 ⊕ b′1
m− b1 ⊕ d1 ⊕ b′1
)∗
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2m−d1−d1⊕b1⊕b′1(sin θ)2(|~d|−m) . (B.17)
Appendix B.2. Probability of exactly one click
We can now compute the probability pj of having just one click in detector Dj by simply computing the
trace of both sides in (B.17):
pj =
2N−1∑
g(~b)=1
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|
2N−1∑
g(~d)=1 : ~d∧~b=~d
(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
×
|~d|∑
m=d1
[( |~d|−d1
m− d1
)]2
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2(m−d1)(sin θ)2(|~d|−m) . (B.18)
In order to obtain an easier expression to compute, we distinguish the cases: b1 = 0, b1 = 1 and the
special case ~b = 100 . . . 0:
pj =
2N−1∑
g(~b)=2
b1=0
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|
2N−1∑
g(~d)=2 : ~d∧~b=~d
d1=0
(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
|~d|∑
m=0
[(|~d|
m
)]2
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2m(sin θ)2(|~d|−m)
+ qN−1(1− q)
(
t
M
)
(this term comes from: ~b = 100 . . . 0 , ~d = 100 . . . 0 )
+
2N−1∑
g(~b)=3
b1=1
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|
×
 2
N−1∑
g(~d)=1 : ~d∧~b=~d
d1=1
(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
|~d|∑
m=1
[( |~d|−1
m− 1
)]2
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2(m−1)(sin θ)2(|~d|−m)
+
2N−1∑
g(~d)=2 : ~d∧~b=~d
d1=0
(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
|~d|∑
m=0
[(|~d|
m
)]2
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2m(sin θ)2(|~d|−m)
 . (B.19)
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We can now partially sum over the vectors ~d since the terms in the sums only depend on the Hamming
weight of these vectors:
pj =
2N−1∑
g(~b)=2
b1=0
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|
|~b|∑
|~d|=1
(|~b|
|~d|
)(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
×
|~d|∑
m=0
[(|~d|
m
)]2
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2m(sin θ)2(|~d|−m) + qN−1(1− q)
(
t
M
)
+
2N−1∑
g(~b)=3
b1=1
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|
×
 |~b|∑
|~d|=1
(|~b|−1
|~d|−1
)(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
|~d|∑
m=1
[( |~d|−1
m− 1
)]2
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2(m−1)(sin θ)2(|~d|−m)
+
|~b|−1∑
|~d|=1
(|~b|−1
|~d|
)(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
|~d|∑
m=0
[(|~d|
m
)]2
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2m(sin θ)2(|~d|−m)
 . (B.20)
By employing the following identity:
|~d|∑
m=0
[(|~d|
m
)]2
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2m(sin θ)2(|~d|−m) = |~d|!
|~d|∑
m=0
(|~d|
m
)
(cos θ)2m(sin θ)2(|~d|−m)
= |~d|! (sin2 θ + cos2 θ)|~d| = |~d|! , (B.21)
both in the second and last row of (B.20), we get the following expression:
pj =
2N−1∑
g(~b)=2
b1=0
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|
|~b|∑
l=1
(|~b|
l
)(
t
M
)l
(1− t)|~b|−ll! + qN−1(1− q)
(
t
M
)
+
2N−1∑
g(~b)=3
b1=1
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|
×
|~b|−1∑
l=0
(|~b|−1
l
)(
t
M
)l+1
(1− t)|~b|−l−1
l∑
m=0
[(
l
m
)]2
(m+ 1)! (l −m)! (cos θ)2m(sin θ)2(l−m)
+
|~b|−1∑
l=1
(|~b|−1
l
)(
t
M
)l
(1− t)|~b|−ll!
 . (B.22)
The remaining sum over m can be similarly simplified as follows:
l∑
m=0
[(
l
m
)]2
(m+ 1)! (l −m)! (cos θ)2m(sin θ)2(l−m) = l! (1 + l cos2 θ) . (B.23)
By substituting (B.23) into (B.22) and by partially summing over vectors ~b we obtain the final expression
for the probability that only detector Dj clicks:
pj = Nq
N−1(1− q)
(
t
M
)
+
N−1∑
r=2
(
N − 1
r
)
qN−r(1− q)r
r∑
l=1
(
r
l
)(
t
M
)l
(1− t)r−ll!
+
N∑
r=2
(
N − 1
r − 1
)
qN−r(1− q)r
[
r∑
l=1
(
r − 1
l − 1
)(
t
M
)l
(1− t)r−l(l − 1)! (sin2 θ + l cos2 θ)
+
r−1∑
l=1
(
r − 1
l
)(
t
M
)l
(1− t)r−ll!
]
. (B.24)
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We observe that the probability pj that only detector Dj clicks is independent of the particular detector
because of the symmetric action of the multiport beam splitter.
Appendix B.3. QBER
Starting from the conditional state (B.17), we can compute the QBER between Alice1 and Alicek’s
outcomes when they measure their qubit in the eigenbasis of the operator OXY (ϕ1) and OXY (ϕk),
respectively, with OXY (ϕ) = cos(ϕ)X + sin(ϕ)Y (X and Y are the Pauli operators). The operator
OXY (ϕ) has eigenvalues λ = ±1 and correspondent eigenvectors: |λ〉ϕ = 1√2 (|0〉+ λeiϕ|1〉).
To start with, we compute the following quantity:
〈~b′|PA1|+1〉ϕ1 ⊗ P
Ak
|−1〉ϕk
|~b〉 = 1
4
(
eb
′
1 iϕ1
)(
(−1)b′keb′k iϕk
) (
e−b1 iϕ1
) (
(−1)bke−bk iϕk) ∏
l 6=1,k
δbl,b′l (B.25)
and we insert it into the probability that Alice1 measured the outcome +1 and Alicek measured the
outcome -1, when Dj clicked:
Tr
[
PA1|+1〉ϕ1
⊗ PAk|−1〉ϕk ρ
j
A1,...,AN
]
=
1
pj
2N−1∑
g(~b)=1
∑
~b′∈Q(~b)
(−1)bk+b′k
4
ei(b
′
1−b1)(ϕ1+φ)e(b
′
k−bk)iϕkqN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|
×
∑
~d∈D(~b,~b′)
(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|ei 2piM (j−1)(k−1)(dk−bk⊕b′k⊕dk)
×
|~d|∑
m=d1
( |~d|−d1
m− d1
)(|~b⊕ ~d⊕ ~b′|−b1 ⊕ d1 ⊕ b′1
m− b1 ⊕ d1 ⊕ b′1
)∗
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2m−d1−d1⊕b1⊕b′1(sin θ)2(|~d|−m) (B.26)
where Q(~b) is a set of at most 2 binary vectors, defined as: Q(~b) = {~b, b1b2 . . . bk . . . bN (iff b1 ⊕ bk = 1)}+.
This means that the sum over ~b′ is reduced to just one term, namely ~b′ = ~b, plus the possibility of a
second term in which ~b′ differs from ~b in position 1 and k, as long as the bits of vector ~b differ from each
other in those positions. Now we compute the sum over ~b′ as follows:
Tr
[
PA1|+1〉ϕ1
⊗ PAk|−1〉ϕk ρ
j
A1,...,AN
]
=
1
pj

2N−1∑
g(~b)=1
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|
4
2N−1∑
g(~d)=1 : ~d∧~b=~d
(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
×
|~d|∑
m=d1
[( |~d|−d1
m− d1
)]2
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2(m−d1)(sin θ)2(|~d|−m)
−
2N−1∑
g(~b)=1 : b1⊕bk=1
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|
4
ei(−1)
b1 (ϕ1+φ)+i(−1)bkϕk+i 2piM (j−1)(k−1)(−1)bk⊕1
×
∑
~d∈D(~b,b1b2...bk...bN )
(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
|~d|∑
m=b1
( |~d|−b1
m− b1
)( |~d|−b1
m− b1
)∗
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2m−1(sin θ)2(|~d|−m)
,
(B.27)
where the set D(~b, b1b2 . . . bk . . . bN ) simplifies to: D(~b, b1b2 . . . bk . . . bN ) = {~d ∈ g−1([1, 2N − 1]) : ~d∧~b =
~d, d1 = b1, dk = bk}. We notice that the first addend in (B.27) is proportional to pj (B.18):
Tr
[
PA1|+1〉ϕ1
⊗ PAk|−1〉ϕk ρ
j
A1,...,AN
]
=
=
1
4
− 1
4pj
2N−1∑
g(~b)=1 : b1⊕bk=1
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|ei(−1)b1 (ϕ1+φ)+i(−1)bkϕk+i 2piM (j−1)(k−1)(−1)bk⊕1
∑
~d∈D(~b,b1b2...bk...bN )
(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
|~d|∑
m=b1
( |~d|−b1
m− b1
)( |~d|−b1
m− b1
)∗
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2m−1(sin θ)2(|~d|−m).
+ The straight line over a bit indicates its negation.
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(B.28)
Finally, we split the sums over ~b in the two sub-cases: b1 = 1, bk = 0 and b1 = 0, bk = 1 and we notice
that the two contributions differ only in the exponential term. By summing the two contributions, the
exponential factor produces a cosine function and one gets:
Tr
[
PA1|+1〉ϕ1
⊗ PAk|−1〉ϕk ρ
j
A1,...,AN
]
=
1
4
− 2 cos
[
(ϕ1 + φ− ϕk) + 2piM (j − 1)(k − 1)
]
4pj
×
N−1∑
|~b|=1
(
N − 2
|~b|−1
)
qN−|~b|(1− q)|~b|
|~b|∑
|~d|=1
(|~b|−1
|~d|−1
)(
t
M
)|~d|
(1− t)|~b|−|~d|
×
|~d|∑
m=1
(|~d|
m
)( |~d|−1
m− 1
)
m! (|~d|−m)! (cos θ)2m−1(sin θ)2(|~d|−m)
=
1
4
− cos
[
(ϕ1 + φ− ϕk) + 2piM (j − 1)(k − 1)
]
2pj
×
N−2∑
r=0
(
N − 2
r
)
qN−r−1(1− q)r+1
r∑
l=0
(
r
l
)(
t
M
)l+1
(1− t)r−l(l + 1)!
l∑
m=0
(
l
m
)
(cos θ)2m+1(sin θ)2(l−m)
=
1
4
− 1
2pj
cos
[
(ϕ1 + φ− ϕk) + 2pi
M
(j − 1)(k − 1)
]
cos θ
×
N−2∑
r=0
(
N − 2
r
)
qN−r−1(1− q)r+1
r∑
l=0
(
r
l
)(
t
M
)l+1
(1− t)r−l(l + 1)! . (B.29)
In a similar fashion, one computes the probability of A1 measuring the outcome -1 and Ak measuring
the outcome +1 and obtains an identical expression to (B.29). In conclusion, the QBER conditioned on
Dj clicking is given by twice the probability given in (B.29).
By fixing the angles ϕ1 and ϕk as mentioned in the protocol’s description: ϕ1 = 0 and ϕk = arg(Ukj) =
2pi
M (k − 1)(j − 1) we minimize the QBER and thus increase the secret key rate. This requires Alicek to
adjust her measurement depending on which detector clicked, implying that such measurement does not
commute with the operations performed by node C. On the other hand, the QBER is now minimal and
reads the same regardless of which couple (A1, Ak) one considers or which detector Dj clicks:
QA1Ak =
1
2
− 1
pj
cosφ cos θ
N−2∑
r=0
(
N − 2
r
)
qN−r−1(1− q)r+1
r∑
l=0
(
r
l
)
(l + 1)!
(
t
M
)l+1
(1− t)r−l , (B.30)
where pj is given in (B.24).
Appendix B.4. Phase-error rate
Finally we compute the phase-error rate, defined as the probability that the product of the Z-
measurement results of all the parties equals +1 (i.e. the qubit of an even number of parties collapsed
in state |1〉, which corresponds to the outcome Z = −1):
QZ = Pr
[
N∏
k=1
ZAk = 1
]
= Tr
[(
2N−1∑
g(~f)=3
|~f| even
P|~f〉
)
ρjA1,...,AN
]
(B.31)
where the quantum state ρjA1,...,AN conditioned on detector Dj clicking is given in (B.17) and the case
g(~f) = 0 is excluded since |~0〉 does not appear in (B.17). By following analogous steps to those presented
in Appendix B.2 we obtain the following expression for the phase-error rate:
QZ =
1
pj
bN−12 c∑
r=1
(
N − 1
2r
)
qN−2r(1− q)2r
2r∑
l=1
(
2r
l
)(
t
M
)l
(1− t)2r−ll!
+
1
pj
bN2 c∑
r=1
(
N − 1
2r − 1
)
qN−2r(1− q)2r
[
2r−1∑
l=1
(
2r − 1
l
)(
t
M
)l
(1− t)2r−ll!
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+2r∑
l=1
(
2r − 1
l − 1
)(
t
M
)l
(1− t)2r−l(l − 1)! (sin2 θ + l cos2 θ)
]
. (B.32)
Appendix B.5. Dark counts
So far we computed the quantities pj , QA1Ak and QZ assuming that every click in the detectors is due
to the arrival of one or more photons. By naming Ωph the event in which one or more photons arrive at
detector Dj and no other photon arrives at any other detector, we can formally express the computed
quantities as:
pj = Pr (Ωph) (B.33)
QA1Ak = Pr (A1 6= Ak|Ωph) (B.34)
QZ = Pr
(∏N
k=1 ZAk = 1|Ωph
)
. (B.35)
For the setup presented in Sec. 1 and the channel model described at the beginning of this Section, the
explicit expressions of (B.33), (B.34) and (B.35) are given in (B.24), (B.30) and (B.32), respectively.
We now assume that every detector is characterized by a probability pd of clicking conditioned on no
photon arriving. We also define Ωclick to be the event in which only detector Dj clicks and Ωno ph to
be the event in which no photon arrives at any detector. Then, the error rates QdcA1Ak and Q
dc
Z and the
probability pdcj that enter the key rate formula and that model the correspondent observed quantities
read as follows:
pdcj = Pr (Ωclick) = pj(1− pd)M−1 + pd(1− pd)M−1Pr(Ωno ph) (B.36)
QdcA1Ak = Pr (A1 6= Ak|Ωclick)
=
1
pdcj
[
Pr (A1 6= Ak|Ωno ph) Pr (Ωno ph) pd(1− pd)M−1 +QA1Ak pj(1− pd)M−1
]
(B.37)
QdcZ = Pr
(∏N
k=1 ZAk = 1|Ωclick
)
=
1
pdcj
[
Pr
(∏N
k=1 ZAk = 1|Ωno ph
)
Pr (Ωno ph) pd(1− pd)M−1 +QZ pj(1− pd)M−1
]
, (B.38)
where pj , QA1Ak and QZ are defined in (B.33), (B.34) and (B.35), respectively, while the probabilities
related to the arrival of no photon read:
Pr (Ωno ph) = (q + (1− q)(1− t))N (B.39)
Pr (A1 6= Ak|Ωno ph) = 1
2
(B.40)
Pr
(∏N
k=1 ZAk = 1|Ωno ph
)
=
1
Pr (Ωno ph)
bN2 c∑
l=0
(
N
2l
)
qN−2l(1− q)2l(1− t)2l . (B.41)
The probabilities (B.39), (B.40) and (B.41) are obtained by following similar steps to those presented in
this Section and that led to the final expressions for pj , QA1Ak and QZ , respectively. The starting point
in this case is the conditional state of the qubits when no photon arrived at any detector:
Pr (Ωno ph) ρ
no ph
A1...AN
= Trσ1,...,σM
l1,...,lN
[
⊗Mi=1P|0〉σi |Φ4〉〈Φ4| ⊗
M
i=1 P|0〉σi
]
(B.42)
Appendix C. Optimized conference key agreement
Although we have shown in Sec. 4 that a truly multipartite QKD scheme can outperform the iterative
use of any bipartite QKD scheme in the direct-transmission scenario (i.e. the central node is removed),
this does not necessarily hold when one has at hand the CKA experimental setup and uses it to perform
bipartite QKD protocols. In other words, it might be possible to outperform the multipartite CKA by
iteratively executing its bipartite version (fix N = 2 in Eq. 3.4) between one selected party and all the
other N − 1 users, and then using the established secret keys to encode the final conference key via one-
time pad encryption. In this case the asymptotic conference key rate would be r(2)/(N −1) according to
the reasoning given at the beginning of Sec. 4, where r(N) is given in (3.4). More generally, it might be
advantageous to group the N parties in subsets of equal cardinality, let them perform the CKA within
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(a) The optimized conference key rate (Eq. C.1, solid
lines) as a function of the loss in the channel linking
one party to the central node, for different fixed
values of q: q = 0.995, 0.998 and 0.999 (top to
bottom). We also plot the direct transmission
bound (Eq. 4.1, dashed line) for five parties. We
observe that the optimized key rate outperforms the
standard CKA especially at high losses (compare
with the case N = 5 in figure 2), since having a
lower number of parties taking part to the CKA all
at once reduces the negative effect of dark counts.
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(b) The optimal number of parties belonging to the
subsets in which the total number of users (N = 5)
have been subdivided, as a function of the loss in
one quantum channel, for different fixed values of
q: q = 0.995, 0.998 and 0.999 (bottom to top). We
observe that performing a truly multipartite scheme
could be optimal especially at low losses, i.e. when
the parties’ shared state is well approximated by a
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Fig. C1: We optimize the conference key rate achieved by N = 5 parties over the cardinality of the subsets of
parties performing the CKA all at once. The different keys established within each subgroup (which can be
composed of either two, three or five parties each) are then used to encode the final conference key.
the subset, and then use the secret keys established in each subset to encode the conference key. Since
one selected party must belong to every subset in order to distribute the final conference key to the others
in a secure way, there are (N − 1)/d subsets of d+ 1 users each. In this case the asymptotic conference
key rate would read: d · r(d+ 1)/(N − 1). In order to investigate which of these configurations yields the
highest asymptotic conference key rate, we optimize the rate with respect to the possible subdivisions
of the N parties in groups of equal cardinality (i.e. we maximize it with respect to all the divisors d of
N − 1):
ropt(N) = max
d|N−1
d
N − 1r(d+ 1) , (C.1)
which includes the cases where the parties are iteratively performing bipartite protocols (d = 1) and
where the N parties are performing the CKA all at once like in figure 2 (d = N − 1).
In figure C1a we plot the optimized conference key rate for N = 5 parties (Eq. C.1, solid lines) as a
function of the loss in each quantum channel, for different fixed values of the parameter q and a fixed
number of input (output) ports of the beam splitter: M = 5. We also plot the direct transmission bound
(4.1) for the same number of parties. The correspondent optimal number of parties within each subset
depends on the loss and on the value of q, and it is given in figure C1b.
From figure C1a we observe that the resulting key rate, although not being optimized over the parameter
q, is similar to the N = 5 key rate in figure 2 for most losses, since we fixed q to values close to the
optimal ones. Furthermore, it performs better than the standard CKA with five parties in the high-loss
region. Indeed, as already explained in figure 2, the effect of dark counts becomes greater when more
parties are performing the CKA at the same time. Thus, allowing for a lower number of parties within
each subset increases the maximum tolerated loss.
In figure C1b we observe that at low losses it is optimal for the five parties to perform a truly multipartite
scheme rather than iteratively performing bipartite protocols. The reason is that in the ideal scenario of
extremely low losses (t −→ 1) and q close to 1, there is only one party successfully sending one photon to
the central node to be detected. In this case the post-selected state shared by the parties is the W -class
state used for establishing the secret key. Of course, there are more chances that this event is going to
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happen when more parties are involved, thus a multipartite scheme is advantageous with respect to an
iteration of bipartite schemes. One can see this also analytically, by showing that the asymptotic rate
(3.4) of the CKA performed by N parties all at once can be approximated as follows (when the above
assumptions hold):
r(N) ' NqN−1(1− q)t
[
1− h
(
1
2
− 1
N
)]
, (C.2)
while the rate achieved by subdividing the task in N − 1 bipartite schemes is:
rbipartite(N) ' 2q(1− q)t
N − 1 . (C.3)
By numerically comparing (C.2) with (C.3) for sufficiently high values of q, one notices that the former
results in a higher key rate. When the value of q decreases, the probability that two or more parties send
their photon to the central node increases, reducing the key rate. Being such events more likely when
more parties are involved, the iterative execution of bipartite schemes is favored. Similarly, increasing
the loss transforms the same events –which are more likely with more parties– from neglected events
(if they cause double clicks) to harmful events (when some photons get lost in the transmission), thus
favoring the iteration of schemes with a low number of parties.
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